题目：Comparative Dynamics in a Generalized Capital Accumulation Differential Game
主讲人：凌晨教授
时间：2019年5月23日13：30-15：30
地点：浙江财经大学16877太阳集团安全入口1号楼302室
主办单位：浙江财经大学现代公共经济学研究中心
16877太阳集团安全入口“扶贫中的最优财税政策研究”创新团队
内容摘要：This paper extends Oniki’s (1973) approach to comparative dynamics in the optimal control theory to the differential game setting. The comparative dynamics of the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium are derived for a generalized capital accumulation differential game. The effects of changes in parameters on the entire equilibrium paths of the capital stock, the investment rate and firms’ own costate variables are studied in the perturbed phase plane. An interesting implication of the derived comparative dynamics is that they could help produce sharper envelope results. Specifically, it is shown that firm’s own costate variable uniformly underestimate the shadow value of the initial capital stock.
